Embassy News
“Opinion Leaders” Roundtable Interview with Ambassador Ryan Crocker
April 11, 2008
QUESTION: “Lebanonization.” Why is it in U.S. interests to the extent of waging combat operations to prevent what has happened in Lebanon and why is it in our interests to go to that extent to prevent it in Iraq?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, first, the reference I made to “Lebanonization” was in a fairly narrow context to describe what I see as a set of Iranian tactics that are similar in Iraq to what they've done in Lebanon, not to describe outcomes, necessarily, or consequences. I do think that this practice of supporting and co-opting militia elements, because they're doing both, with the so-called special groups of Jaish al Mahdi that are effectively under Iranian direction, as were the co-opted Dawa party elements in '83 in Kuwait when they went after us there, and as was Hezbollah at its inception with (inaudible) and his colleagues.
I don't think it's going to have by any means the same outcomes in Iraq, because there are some definite limits on Iranian influence. And we've seen this again in the wake of the Basra events where there was a strong, broadly-based negative reaction to the militias and to the Iranians behind them and in support of Maliki for going down there to take them on. And this certainly included groups with whom the Iranians have had close connections, like the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. So they don't have the same ability, I think, to pressure and divide Iraqis as they managed in Lebanon.
They are also working against a strong popular reaction. One of the really important developments, in my view, in Iraq over this last year has been sort of a popular stance against extremist militias, whether they be Sunni or Shi’a. The Anbar thing, of course, very well known and established, people just saying, we don't want this anymore. Less, I think, acutely seen among the Shi’a but very much there.
The reaction to Jaish al Mahdi's attempts to take over the shrines in Karbala in August, the negative public reaction led Muqtada al Sadr to declare the stand down. And, you know, it's hard to measure now. But anecdotally, we get the same sense of negative popular reaction against Jaish al Mahdi this time as well, not something we necessarily see in Lebanon for reasons that several people around this table know exceedingly well.
So again, it's also a matter of scale and centrality. Lebanon got pretty bad in the course of the '80s. But it didn't run the risk of destabilizing the entire region. It's matters of scale, it's matters of who are present. A Lebanonization of Iraq in the sense of total spiral down into violence, I think, would bring back al Qaeda, for example, be a real strategic risk to the United States.
QUESTION: An extension of that (inaudible) I'm wondering what you learned, what the two days of hearings said to you is different about the mood, about the political support, about the understanding of this kind of complicated analogy that you've drawn both in Congress and in public opinion. How is it different this year than last year?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I was struck, although not surprised -- as a difference, the focus on the resource issue, how much this is costing and how can we afford to keep on doing it. I certainly understand that. I do think you're seeing a shift into more Iraqi spending, which means less U.S. spending. At the same time, to the extent that that concern takes people toward a “we've done all we can, we're tired of this, we're walking away,” you've got to then go the next step and ask what the consequences of that are going to be.
It's not a question here of withdraw the troops and end the war. You withdraw the troops, yes, we can do that; but you do not end the war. In my judgment, you send it spiraling in exactly the wrong direction along the lines I've indicated, neighbors coming in, widespread sectarian killing and new space for al Qaeda. That has cost, too. So it's -- I think as we have this national debate, we've got to be sure we understand what's really at stake here.
QUESTION: As your (inaudible) your focus does seem to shift more to Iran. I have a little bit of trouble understanding what your strategy is, how it is that you think that Iran (inaudible) militarily or wooed in some other fashion so that it begins to cooperate rather than obstructing U.S. policy. I'm puzzled by that, and I'm especially puzzled by it after what happened over the last several weeks (inaudible). What is it we're doing to try to get Iran into a position that would be (inaudible)?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, first, on al Qaeda, we've had significant success against al Qaeda. But that doesn't mean it's gone away, or certainly doesn't mean we're not riveted on it. That is -- that is our strategic enemy. And we've got to be absolutely certain that it does not find the circumstances to regenerate itself. So, yes, Iran is getting a lot of focus, but that is not taking focus away from al Qaeda and the effort in the north, because that is absolutely critical to our national security.
You know, with respect to Iran in Iraq, of course, I'm in Iraq. There are things we are doing there. The security dialogue, the Iraqis are trying to organize another round. We've said, you know, we'll be there in response to an Iraqi request. We'll see if the Iranians respond.
We've made it clear that any Quds Force officers that we find in Iraq are going to have a -- perhaps a longer sojourn than they planned on. And we've been pretty relentless in going after those Iranian-backed elements that are trying to engage us or Iraqi forces. There are a whole lot fewer individuals around in Sadr City on rocket squads now than there were when this thing touched off.
QUESTION: There may be fewer, but there are enough to make a mess of the Green Zone. They can do that at will.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, actually, they can't do it at will. Look at the rates of -- you know, what we were contending with in those first few days, versus the ones and twos that we're getting now. And a far diminished scope of fire with far less effect. It's -- I'd say it's a career field that has a lot of openings in it.
Now, take -- now, more broadly, how do you deal with the Iranian challenge? It's something we have got to think about as a government, as certain thoughtful columnists have pointed out in recent days. Iran is a broad-gauge challenge. It supports Hezbollah in Lebanon against that government and against Israel. It supports Hamas against Israel. It supports the Taliban against the Afghan government and against NATO forces in Afghanistan. And it supports Jaish al Mahdi elements against the Iraqi government and our forces in Iraq. So I think we're going to have to do some further national level thinking on how you deal with this multifaceted challenge, and how or if you get a different type of thinking in Tehran.
Because it has seemed to me for some time what they're doing, particularly on their own borders -- you know, they almost went to war with the Taliban in Afghanistan in 1999. That is an existential enemy for Iran. And, of course, they did go to war in a brutal eight-year war with Iraq. So I'd like to think at some point, some longer term strategic thinking is going to come into play, because -- you know, I'm hardly qualified to speak about Iranian national security, but it would seem that having stable outcomes under democratic governments in both countries is the best guarantee that Iran would have that you're not going to get a Taliban (inaudible), you're not going to get a murderous dictator next door in Iraq.
QUESTION: What are you going to tell the Saudi leaders when you see them (inaudible)? And is this an attempt to enlist the Arab states to help you in Iraq to block the Iranian challenge? Because we hear the Arabs complaining, chafing privately, nothing is being done to blunt the Iranian influence in the region. Is this a chance to enlist them, to challenge the Iranian influence and to help the Iraqi government?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, Hisham, I'm sure it will disappoint you considerably to know that we actually intend to deliver our messages directly to the Saudis instead of having them broadcast over Al Arabiya. (Laughter.)
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: You know the reality better than I. The Iranians are pushing away in Iraq and the Arabs are really not there. There is not a single Arab ambassador in Baghdad. I've been there over a year.
QUESTION: Not a single one? Ambassadors?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Not an ambassador. I've been there over a year. As far as I can recall, there hasn't been a single visit by an Arab cabinet minister in the course of a year.
The Arabs have not really, you know, come forward to help with the economic burdens of Iraq. And yet, Iraq is a central part of the Arab world, a founding member of the Arab League and, for better or worse, mostly for worse, over the last 50 years, a significant actor in Arab affairs.
This is an opportunity for the Arabs to step up, to counter Iranian influence, build an entirely new relationship between Iraq and the Arabs. And they need to take it. I mean, these are their vital interests. You know, they need to be involved in stepping up to support positive outcomes in Iraq and not just sitting this out.
I understand some of the concerns they have. The Egyptians lost their ambassador there.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: The Jordanians -- the Bahrainian charge was almost killed. But I am literally here to tell you and tell them, yes, you can operate an embassy in Iraq. Not without risk, but you can do vital business. And we're ready to help. We've made that clear to the Saudis, Kuwaitis, others who have said they're considering this.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) the Maliki government?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: You hear -- to the extent -- and some have expressed that. And, you know, with Maliki's decision to take on Iranian-backed Shi’a militias, that should count for something for those who have been concerned that the government was sectarian and interested only in Shi’a interests.
You know, right now, this government and Iraqi security forces are engaged simultaneously in Basra against Jaish al Mahdi extremists supported by Iran, and in Mosul against al Qaeda. You know, two mortal enemies of the Arabs. And, you know, Maliki and his security forces are stepping up to this. That, I think, should be acknowledged by the Arab states.
QUESTION: (Inaudible) strategic framework. When you were up on the Hill, some Republicans were also very concerned about this idea. And I kind of take the point of Democrats who say, look, you know, President Bush is at historically really low approval ratings, he's in his last year in office. This war is opposed by the vast majority of American people. Why is that the time to negotiate a strategic framework? Why not leave it to the next guy?
And I know the argument the U.N. mandate ends in the end of the year and we need a status of forces agreement. Why not break that off from the strategic discussion, come to a more standard status of forces agreement, but leave the strategic issues of what we're committing to Iraq for the next Commander in Chief?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, first, I think it's important to understand what this is exactly about. We're negotiating a status of forces agreement as an executive agreement. Meaning it will not have in it any provisions that will trigger a necessity for ratification by the Senate.
The strategic framework agreement, as we see it, is not going to rise to the level of an executive agreement. It will simply lay out areas, political, economic, cultural, scientific, other fields, where we and Iraq feel we have common goals and scope to cooperate. It will probably resemble something close to the strategic partnership agreement we have with Afghanistan from 2005. The Iraqis want it as kind of a guideline to the relationship. But it is not going to have in it commitments.
And this leads into another thing that's important and I'm not sure widely enough understood. Iraq is developing as a -- as a government and as a country that is increasingly focused on its desire to be fully sovereign. They do not want another Chapter 7 resolution that labels them a threat to international peace and security. It kind of makes them a ward of the international community. They want to have a normal, bilateral relationship with the U.S. and other countries. And that does necessitate this process.
It is also the case that the Iraqis are not kind of just sitting there and we have to push or pull them to any effort to stand up for themselves. The Basra operations, that was an Iraqi initiative. And you can certainly question how well was it planned, how well was it executed, but they did plan and execute it on their own. And at the same time they were doing that, they were doing a lot of other things in Karbala and (inaudible) and Nasiriyah, also independently. Nor is it the case they're unwilling -- coming back to the resources -- they're unwilling to spend their money. There aren't many finance ministers around like the Iraqi finance minister who says, money is not the object; we've got the money. It's capacity to actually execute.
And when they develop the capacity, I referred in my testimony to this trash collection project we had under a USAID program for Baghdad. You know, we were basically paying people to pick up the trash and so forth. The Baghdad municipality worked on this, got their own effort together, the trucks, the people, the system, and they wanted to have that. They said, you know, save yourselves 100 million; we'll do the trash collection from here on in.
They're looking for ways to show that they are, again, a sovereign country, running their own affairs. This whole SOFA thing is part of that.
QUESTION: I take your point on that. But what I don't get is, I mean, you saw -- you got both barrels, the trust is gone on this. The Democrats don't trust you, don't trust this administration on this. They think the Iraqis want buy in from the Bush administration because they'll get a better deal from the Bush administration than they will from a Democratic (inaudible) next year. There's that suspicion. And if you don't get any Democrats to support this and Bush rams this through, again, in the fall in the middle of an election season, is that conducive to sort of a smooth transition here? It just seems to me bad timing. In part that the Iraqis want, because Congress is really starting to think about what they want and less what the Iraqis want.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: And I appreciate that. Look, this will be a transparent process. Because we do have classified SOFAs. This will not be a classified SOFA. And even if we wanted to do it that way, the Iraqis in their system, it has got to be a public document. So as this moves forward, I think Congress, Americans are going to see what is really involved here. And there is no there there in the kinds of things that we heard concerns expressed about over the last few days. It's going to look like 83 other SOFAs with the exception of the unique authorities to carry on operations after the first of the year. But SOFAs don't -- by definition, you understand executive agreements, they do not bind the executive.
QUESTION: It's less the SOFA than the strategic framework --
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: And that's where, again, as I said, the SOFA will be an executive agreement. We do not expect that the SFA will rise even to that level, be aspirational.
QUESTION: Ryan, can I come back to the -- I just wanted to come back to the Iran question for a minute. Can you speak to the Iranian role in getting the ceasefire here, Sulaimani, and what messages they communicated to us and if they did, and what does this say about Iranian intentions and what does it say about Iran's irrevocable influence in Iraq if the Iranians had to run?
And just one other point. In your testimony, you talked about the need for horizontal integration as well as vertical. When one talks about bottom up, it isn't enough to talk about all these separate improvements somehow. What is the key to vertical?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, those are two huge questions.
QUESTION: Sorry.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Look, on the Iranian element, you know, one thing I have learned over the years is that communications via intermediaries is not something you -- I learned that in Lebanon, actually -- you have to take with more than many grains of salt. You know, so various people have said the Iranians want you to know this, the Iranians want you to know that. I don't put a lot of stock in it. If the Iranians have something they want to tell us, then they can agree to sit down with the Iraqis and us at a table and they can tell us directly.
What was the Iranian role in the ceasefire? Well, as that introduction would suggest, I can't really say. I can explain that ceasefire or Muqtada al Sadr's statement in Iraqi rather than Iranian terms, though. Just as Muqtada saw the outbreak of violence in Karbala in August as being bad politics for him because people didn't like it, it may simply be that he read this the same way.
My understanding is that the Sadrists tried to negotiate a joint statement with the government of Iraq and the government said, not doing it, and so they just went ahead and put it out as a statement under the -- over the name of Muqtada al Sadr. And that would take you to the next point, which is --
QUESTION: Iran?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Iran, yeah. I'm not at all sure that they're coming out of this in -- not only in a better place, but not in a particularly good place. Talking to -- there is a different tone in Baghdad at the time I left with folks who had not been critical of Iranians are now pretty critical. I mean, nobody liked what they saw in Baghdad and Basra and there's a history here. It's kind of reminded people of what they went through with Iran in the '80s.
Never mind that Saddam started that war, it was the Iraqi people who had to fight it. And you can see echoes of that coming up now in conversations. People are saying, well, it's another war of the cities. That was back when Tehran and Baghdad were getting thumped by each side, except now it's only us that's getting hit. That probably isn't an atmosphere that the Iranians really want to see develop.
So we will see what they do going forward. But I think that they've -- they have hit maybe the limits of their influence pretty hard.
And the other question was the linkages?
QUESTION: The ceasefire that they negotiated, you don't see that as any indication that they recognize limits? I mean, that the Iraqis had to go to them to get the ceasefire? What does that say?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, again, there wasn't a negotiated ceasefire. And indeed, Iraqi security forces operations are continuing in Basra as well as in Sadr City. The Iraqi government didn't commit itself to anything on this. And what I was trying to say is that I can explain what Sadr did without reference to the Iranians necessarily making him do it. Maybe they didn't stop him from doing it. Maybe they encouraged him because they saw this as bad for them. I mean, I don't know.
But he did a stand down on his own in August and I don't find it a stretch to think that maybe he did it the same way. Yes, there's lots of conversations and discussions and backing and forthing between Iraqis and Iranians. But, you know, I don't see anything that persuades me that the Iraqis ordered Muqtada to stand down. He did it. And certainly there is no -- the idea of a brokered ceasefire absolutely is not there, because Maliki was (inaudible).
QUESTION: Provincial elections? I mean, just from the outside (inaudible) big thing is going to happen before the end of this year --
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: That's it.
QUESTION: -- it would seem to be the big thing. If you could just -- do you expect them on October 1st? There's obviously a very big upside. How do you weigh the upsides and the obvious downsides in terms of possible spike of violence, possible Sadrist victories in the south, et cetera? Sort of walk through how you --
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I think you're right that elections will be the big political event of the second half of the year. And I think that there's no question in my mind that the Iraqi leadership is serious about having them. Because they're pushing ahead on the preparations now. The cabinet voted last week to allocate $100 million to the Iraqi High Electoral Commission so they can get started with the voter list preparations, the recruiting and training of staff, all the infrastructure that's going to have to go into these elections. They are working through the elections law right now, something on which they've asked for both U.N. and U.S. advice, to be sure they get it right technically.
The current draft puts the election on the basis of an open list system rather than the closed list, which is a good thing. It means, you know, the electorate is voting for people, not simply a party, and that establishes more accountability, I think, on the part of provincial representatives. They're asking for our advice on how you ensure minority and female representation, so forth and so on. So I think they're clearly serious about it. Lots and lots of work to be done.
Now, what are the implications? And one way in which things have changed for the better in Iraq, the Sunnis can't wait for these elections. They are going to vote at expected rates of 110 percent. Entire graveyards will be voting. But, you know, the recognition that the boycott was not a good idea.
And incidentally, that's one of the challenges, because with internal displacement, how do IDPs vote? And the Iraqis are thinking about that. They'll probably get to vote where they are, but the ballot is counted in their place of permanent residence.
So, you know, that will both redress boycott-related imbalances in mixed provinces, Baghdad, Ninawa, Mosul for example, but also in provinces like Anbar where the current provincial government was elected by a tiny percentage of almost all of it non-tribal elements of the population. It gives those tribes that stood up with us on the awakening, it gives them a literal stake in the system, and that's very important. And lots of activity out in Anbar is, so, tell us how this political party thing works again, how are they organized?
Among the Shi’a, in many respects equally important. There are, you know, when you have contending factions seeking power, you can either slug it out in the streets or you can go to the polls on it. And it is going to be essential to have these elections to sort out the tensions among the (inaudible), Dawa, Sadr supreme council.
QUESTION: Could you elaborate on one thing about the awakening? Can you contrast their nonparticipation in the prior elections with what you're looking for in October?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Oh, I think it's going to be night to day.
QUESTION: Like zero to 100 or something like that?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, like I said, I think they're working on about 150. But -- and that's going to be a challenge, too, making sure these meet reasonable standards of fairness. And, you know, I don't know how this is going to play among the Shi’a parties. We'll have to have elections to find that kind of thing out.
There is a risk of violence. And, in fact, I would go beyond that. I'd say there will be some increased levels of violence associated with these elections. And it's going to be incumbent upon the Iraqi government and us to kind of figure out where the more sensitive spots are, what the currents are, and move to do everything we can collectively to keep that down to as low a level as possible.
QUESTION: (Inaudible)?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: More troops?
QUESTION: Well, stop the withdrawal in July. Do you think that's the reason General Petraeus is a little skeptical about -- you know, when elections have come up in the past, you've always sort of surged troops through -- you know, keep people in theater longer while you bring other people in. I am just curious whether that is part of the equation?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: You know, not -- I think not specifically. I mean, the time table of July was, of course, set long before elections were announced for the fall. But obviously, as we -- as the -- as we assess, you know, elections is going to be part of that assessment.
QUESTION: You talked a little bit earlier about how the elections are going to fit into the long-term knitting together of Iraqi society, the vertical integration, and also what role the provinces will play and the center will play?
QUESTION: When is the national election? Is that --
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: The national elections will be late '09.
QUESTION: But these really will happen October 1st, '08, is that the idea? (Inaudible.)
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: The reference to October 1st was in the Provincial Powers Act. And that, as I understand it, that is aspirational. It is -- that law does not set an election date; the electoral law will.
You know, I think what we're talking about is fall '08. and whether it's, you know, October, November or even December, less important than it happen in that time frame.
QUESTION: And all of them either on one day or pretty close to each other?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Yeah, again, that also is something the law will have to sort out. The prevailing view seems to be do it all on one day, that the chances for fraud spike if you stagger it.
QUESTION: Can I ask you -- just broader knitting together of society, what role do the center and the provinces play? How do you foresee that?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, the Provincial Powers Law that was passed ultimately last month will go into effect after these elections and apply to the new provincial governments. And, you know, it explicitly gives these provincial councils, provincial governments a right to legislate, as long as such legislation does not contradict the national constitution. This will be a new departure and a major step toward a truly federal -- truly federal system. It gives more authority and also more responsibility to provincial councils than they have had thus far. So that will be significant.
It will give you bodies that will be in tune with the times. And that's why you have elections. Very important as more resources are going to the provinces and they in turn develop better ability to spend those resources. And it will set the stage, obviously, for the national elections that follow a year later. The whole process will be part of that integration.
The one tremendous thing -- one of the tremendous things Iraq has going for it, of course, is money. And they have done a pretty good job of equitable distributions to the provinces and they've upped it again substantially. The same council of ministers vote last week provided that $350 million package for the three cities also doubled the allocations to the provinces from $30- to $60 million for microfinance and -- microfinance, both loan and grant. And it will be again provincial bodies that implement these things.
The integration in a sense is accomplished by the federal government providing resources and then the provincial governments figuring out what they're going to do with them. And the Iraqis have now invented the supplemental. (Laughter.)
QUESTION: God help them.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: And it's interesting --
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Their supplemental is all about a surplus. Because oil prices have increased, the finance ministry has announced a $5 billion supplemental for the summer, but to be able to tap into it, you have to demonstrate a certain rate of execution on your regular budget, both for the federal ministries and for the provinces. So it's a real incentive to, you know, to actually execute.
The other thing that comes into play on this is Iraq's sort of hybrid system. You have provincial budgets and provincial councils as well as local bodies. But you also have provincial representatives of federal ministries who have resources of their own. Directors general of the various line ministries are out in the provinces. And what we're seeing is progressive improvement in the coordination between provincial councils and those ministry directors general. When it started out, there were no provincial councils, there were only directors general. Then you had both, each ignoring the other. And now you're moving toward increased cooperation, where provincial councils and directors general work out project priorities, who is going to do what, who is going to fund what. And that is substantially improving center-periphery coordination.
The planning ministry last month -- is that when we had the USAID conference in Baghdad? -- the ministry has now agreed that in developing project priorities for the provinces that are executed by the federal government through the directors general, they will take as their base document not a Baghdad-generated plan but provincial plans that the provinces will put together and send up to Baghdad. So that's also a first as of just this spring.
And again, you know, I am not trying to over-gloss this. The challenges are huge. But, frankly, the progress has been pretty impressive as well. Lots and lots to do. The tenor of our testimony, and nothing I say here should take away from that, but --
QUESTION: Can I ask you a question about progress that you think you may or may not have made here with politicians other than the President? Can you just assess that quickly?
And then also with a trip like this, when American politicians are saying, the Iraqis aren't standing up for themselves, they're hoarding their money, what kind of an effect does that have in Iraq? Do you have days of cleanup ahead of you?
And then I want to ask you the last question, which is about the presidential campaign, which is how much noise does it insert in the system? You know, the closer we get to the end of the year, the more this will be certainly a part of the American system, creating noise so Congress doesn't get anything done. How hard does that make your job?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, on the first, you know, I mentioned that I clearly heard the concern on resources. We talked a little bit about that.
In terms of Iraqi reactions, everybody gets frustrated. You know, Americans are frustrated and understandably so. I'm frustrated, God knows, just trying to get stuff done. Iraqis get frustrated, too. I mean, it's hard for them. It's not like that they want the state to collapse or utterly fail and parliament to deadlock and everything to go to hell. They don't. But this is tough stuff, carried out in conditions for them of extreme difficulty and danger.
So yes, I suspect I will go back to some level of frustration saying, you know, good god, we are doing the best we can, we are doing three times better on budget execution this year than last. And again, I think the frustration is compounded by the sentiment I described.
Iraqis in the region are known for, A) being pretty tough cookies, right? But, B) having a strong sense of national identity and national pride. And to hear that they're deliberately not stepping forward, whether it's in security, economic development or anything else, I think really does hurt. But if that inspires them to even greater effort, so be it.
QUESTION: But does it?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: You know, I think on the economic side, in particular, it does. Because that's something that is -- you know, that's quantifiable. You can say, we picked up these contracts, we're spending here, we signed the billion-dollar contract on the underwater pipelines there. But then again, you know, as I said earlier, it hasn't been, in my judgment, lack of will to execute; it has been lack of capacity. And, you know, the amount of progress you can make is finite on that. It takes time.
QUESTION: Two things. Can you address the Sons of Iraq and how it's going in terms of integrating them into the security services, and whether in areas we're beginning to see them mature into political movements? And, two, is it too early to gauge Sunni reaction to the government's action in Basra and Sadr City? Are the Sunni tribesmen beginning to conclude, well, maybe this government isn't being run by Iran?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: On the second, certainly the initial Sunni response described as from the incident up to now has been very much in that direction. That, well, my oh my, they're ready to go slug it out with Shi’a extremists. You know, and positive to the extent that you haven't heard much of -- much in the way of criticism over both problems in the operation, execution, and the fact that the Prime Minister did this without any extensive consultation with the other elements of the leadership. They've -- the Sunni political leadership seems to have taken the position, at least for this phase, that this is important enough both in terms of the challenge it posed to the state and the way the state met the challenge, that we are going to be supportive and we are not going to get into criticism. Even though there certainly would be a basis for the latter if they so chose.
Now, how will this evolve down the line? I don't know, it will depend on how the government carries it forward. But I think you've got more national unity around this Basra-Baghdad thing than I've seen during my time there. Now, can it be sustained, how does it move forward, is another matter.
QUESTION: Sons of Iraq?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Sons of Iraq? The integration is proceeding. I think there are 20-odd thousand now that have been brought in --
QUESTION: How many?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Twenty-odd thousand, 21,000, 22,000.
QUESTION: Out of a total?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I think 90. Yeah, and again, bear in mind that about 20 percent of the Sons of Iraq are actually Shi’a, not counting the ones in the south that are being brought on now.
The Prime Minister's commitment is that all of them are going to be brought in to long-term employment. Most of that will be civilian, 20 to 30 percent security forces, the remaining civilian employment, possibly via technical or vocational training. The Prime Minister has committed himself that they will pick all that up over time.
In a sense, the real question on integration is we and the Iraqis would agree that there is still an important security rule for a certain percentage of the 70 percent that will transition to nonsecurity employment, in the sense that what they're doing now is important for the time being, in that transition maybe comes a little bit later rather than sooner when conditions are in place.
How does this translate politically? It's hard to say. Because the Sons of Iraq, you know, it's not a political movement per se. the tribal awakening is becoming that, but that's a broader phenomenon. When you get into areas of Baghdad where we have the Sons of Iraq, that becomes very localized. And how the individuals involved choose to express themselves politically, whether they're going to go with established parties, whether they're going to try and coalesce around something new, again, that's why you have elections. It will be fun to watch.
MR. REEKER: We've got to wrap it up, so last one.
QUESTION: This week's testimony was premised on this picture of (inaudible) troop levels and political factors which, you know, is a little bit unrealistic. So I just want to ask you, let's assume it's October. Let's assume that the Democratic candidate is well ahead in the polls and looks like he could win. That candidate has pledged to begin troop withdrawals upon taking office. Let's assume that (inaudible) Iraqi reaction to it, you're not able to negotiate a SOFA that has the authority that you like. In fact, the process gets hung up.
My question is, if what we're looking at in October is discontinuity, the possibility of a sharp, sudden, step change in the nature of U.S. involvement in Iraq (inaudible) what's the Iraqi reaction going to be? You painted this dire picture in your testimony about, you know, (inaudible) bloodbath, but you may have to deal very soon with the reality of Iraqis coming to you. What -- in the picture I described in October, how would Iraqis react and what would you say to them as the American ambassador?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, I'm not sure I would share those assumptions, starting with the SOFA. You know, we know what we intend here. And what we intend is an executive agreement. And it is going to be, you know, a public executive agreement. I just don't think there is, come fall or whenever, there is going to be any valid objection to a document that does not trigger ratification provisions.
With respect to who might be elected or where policy goes, you know, after the election there is going to be a transition. Obviously, you've got one President and one Commander in Chief at a time. And I work for the one we've got now. At the same time, I would expect, there will be a very engaged transitioning process to ensure that, in all respects, it's as seamless as possible. And Iraq will clearly be a big part of it.
But --
QUESTION: What will Iraqis -- if Iraqis think that (inaudible), what are they going to gain?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Look, I have said, you know, almost as long as I've been there that if the Iraqis think that we are heading for the doors, not because conditions permit our redeployment but just because we don't want to do this anymore, the first thing that's going to happen is the spirit of compromise goes away. Because it just gets too damn risky.
You know, the kind of tradeoffs and concessions that not only produced legislative packages but the underlying sense of improving security and diminishment of threat that let all those hundreds of thousands of Shi’a walk through (inaudible) at the end of February, I think that goes away. People will start worrying again about community survival. And then you run the risk of having what is starting to look a bit like a virtuous spiral, then reverse itself and you get the vicious spiral. And I've laid out what my concerns are on that.
QUESTION: One real quick question. When you and (inaudible) you said you had a couple goals (inaudible) put a year and a half on Bush's clock, get the Republicans (inaudible) the surge. But you also talked about finding some middle ground in this war, some bipartisan middle ground. That is not working. I'm just curious whether, especially after being on the Hill recently, if you feel sorry about that. It seems like that is not going to happen in your tenure.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, Iraq is a national challenge for us. It engages our vital national interests and, you know, I just have to say as a citizen going forward, I hope there is a serious national debate that looks into both the realities of what -- of where we are now and where current policies seem to be taking us, but also a very sober discussion of alternatives.
Because when I hear people say let's bring the troops home and end the war, good God, it's not going to end the war. It is going to give you a war, in my judgment -- I have no claims to omniscience -- but I think it's going to give you a war of significantly increased proportions. And, you know, I believe we are an intensely moral people as Americans. I have always been proud to represent my country because that's the kind of country it is.
I remember how we reacted to Rwanda. How could we have let that happen? Why didn't we step in? Why didn't we get the international community engaged? Well, you know, what if you have a humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq and it's not a question of why didn't we step in, it's we stepped out. How is that going to affect people?
I don't have answers here. I just think we need to have more of a debate on the consequences of alternative courses of action than perhaps we have had thus far.
MR. REEKER: A good spot to end.
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