Embassy News
Press Conference with Ambassador Ryan Crocker
April 3, 2008
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Thanks to all of you for coming. I guess I will just start with a few comments on Basra, because I really do think this is of considerable significance for a couple of reasons.
The prime minister has just made a statement on Basra, which he just now -- in which he said that that operation was a signal of his determination to go after criminal elements, whoever and wherever they might be, and he will take that action whenever it is necessary to do so, and re-emphasizing this was not against a political party or a parties, but against those outside the law.
He also announced that the government of Iraq will be providing $100 million in economic assistance to Basra, a process that will be managed by the central government, in partnership with the provincial government, and that he is moving ahead with -- on an urgent basis -- with a major job, or employment program, giving 25,000 jobs.
And that, I guess, underscores again some of the significance of this. This was an Iraqi operation conceived, planned, executed by the Iraqi security forces under the prime minister's direction. And, you know, there has been a lot of discussion on problems in planning and in execution, and that may be perfectly valid. But this, nonetheless, is still an undertaking that the Iraqis simply have not been able to embark on before. And while, clearly, they ran into some very tough conditions in Basra, they also achieved some significant results: in particular, the fact that Umm Qasr, Zubair, Abu Flus ports are now all three completely in Iraqi government hands, Umm Qasr in particular. But this is significant.
And the other issue of significance to me, at least, is kind of looking at this in context. You have Iraqi government forces both, composed of both Sunnis and Shia, engaged in Basra against extremist Shia militias. At the same time, you've got Iraqi security forces -- again, both Sunni and Shia in composition -- engaged in Mosul against extremist Sunni elements -- in this case, al Qaeda. And, of course, those two extremes, Sunni and Shia, have a common aim, which is taking apart the state.
So, again, I'm not here to say that this is a huge victory for Iraq. It is a tough fight in Basra and Mosul, and elsewhere. But I think Basra, in its own terms, as I've described, and then when you look at an Iraqi military that is simultaneously engaged against equal and opposite extremes, it is worth noting. So that is, anyhow, the fruit of my overnight ponderings that I just felt compelled to share with all of you.
And with that, I am open to your questions.
QUESTION: I guess, really, wanting to start with a little bit more elaboration on Basra, you are about to go, obviously, to the United States and talk to Congress about where things stand. Has the last week changed your thinking and your presentation in any way? And if so, in what way?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, again, I just want to be extremely clear and a little careful here. You've got to buy a ticket to hear the testimony. That will be delivered on the 8th and 9th of April; it is not going to be delivered today, in this room.
So, I recognize that, obviously, here I am with all of you, talking about events in Iraq five days before I do this, so I realize that's a pretty fine distinction. But I just would not want any of my responses to be characterized as, "Here is what I'm going to say," when I sit down on the Hill next week.
Look, just about every day that goes by in Iraq changes the way I think about things. I have been here a little over a year now. This is an enormously complex place, as all of you know better than I, with lots of things moving around all of the time, some good, some not so good. So as, I think, just my opening comments would suggest, I do consider what happened in Basra an important event, very much an ongoing operation -- the prime minister has made it clear he is going to keep at this -- and one in which, obviously, the Iraqi forces saw some hard fighting. But it is of significance.
QUESTION: Do you consider it as a set-back for U.S. policy? I mean, there was a week of extreme violence, you know, which reversed -- well, not reversed, but at least showed the fragility of the security situation here, you know, a prime minister who, by all accounts, came out of -- they had to negotiate behind his back to get him out of something that he had not consulted with the Americans about, had not consulted with the British about, and seemingly, had not consulted with many members of his government about.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Actually, I don't see it as a set-back for Iraq. And, you know, again, it depends on what happens going forward. There is still a major, major problem in Basra.
But both as an indication of, you know, intention, resolve, ability, they moved something like a division's worth of forces in very short order from all over in the south, this area, one brigade from Anbar. You know, they did it themselves, they got them there, and they got in the fight. So I think that's important.
We have always said that gains here are fragile. And I have always said, "Look, there are going to be set-backs." But in this instance, when the fighting in Iraq came about because the government was taking on militias -- not much fun, obviously, when you're underneath it, as we were -- but I think the net result was clearly a positive step forward for the government.
And you know, were there deals? Like everything else, that's not an engagement you win purely by military means. The prime minister is employing the economic dimension of power right now. And, you know, good on him. I think, in many respects, it's the most important weapon, and he is using it.
He has started an engagement with the tribes, too, as you know. And he also referred to, in a statement, where the southern tribes, that I think then were kind of in the middle or estranged from the government, and the established political parties have now, in large numbers. It was a massive gathering yesterday of individuals signing up as security volunteers down in Basra, I mean thousands of them. So, it seems like the tribes have moved over.
We can talk about the Sadr statement, if you will. I think that clearly had an impact. But it was a Sadr statement, it was not a Sadr – it was not a joint statement. And in my interpretation, at least, it looks like the Sadr trend -- Sayyad Muqtada himself -- were not all that comfortable with the way things were going, a major battle of extremist militias associated with him against government forces.
So, again, you know, a complex picture. There were obviously -- I saw the prime minister yesterday. He was pretty sober about this, not coming back in any kind of triumphal spirit, but you know, serious, major, said that there would clearly have to be a lessons learned exercise, which is also a very healthy development. But also, absolutely certain that he had done the right thing by taking these guys on, and committed to staying with it until he gets Basra to a better place.
So, I see it as, overall, you know -- always there are pluses and minuses here. I mean, nothing is ever going to be completely one thing or another, at least not here. But, overall, I see this as a positive development.
QUESTION: Ambassador, are you surprised at the velocity and the scope of the backlash of their moving -- I mean, we heard for a long time, talk about the fragmentation of Sadr's movement, and nobody is listening to anybody, and then, all of a sudden, after having gotten away with it, in effect, by (inaudible), Al Kut, and other places, they went into Basra and you had certainly not a nationwide uprising, but a regional uprising.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, it is always hugely tempting, when you're sitting where I sit and someone asks a question like that, to say, "I foresaw it all." But I can't say that.
Look, I was down in Basra at the end of January, and met with the governor, the military and police commanders, political figures, tribal leaders. And probably not news to many of you, but this is the first time I had really gotten this sort of concentrated message that things were really bad in Basra. I mean really bad. And it -- again, I knew things were not good. But hearing it from the people who are responsible down there definitely got my attention.
Again, so while I can't -- certainly can't say that I thought there would be violence on that scale, neither does it entirely surprise me. And –
QUESTION: I'm sorry, when did you go?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: This was the end of January. And -- but it's not just Jaish al Mahdi, and special groups, as I heard at that time. There is something called Tha’r Allah, "the vengeance of God." There is a local Hezbollah. And, incidentally, I understand the Iraqis yesterday were engaged against, primarily, the Tha’r Allah militants. So, you know, just a lot of bad stuff down there.
QUESTION: Ambassador, you say that, you say all these different groups. But when Sadr made his order, he basically shut most of it down. Doesn't it show you a great deal about his power?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Again, it seemed to taper a little more gradually in Basra. And it's hard for me to say whether that -- you know, obviously, there were people there in Basra who were listening to them.
But then how it goes from there, it's hard for me to say, whether it was everybody listening to them, and it just took some a little longer to hear, or whether, as elements got out of the fight, other elements said, "This doesn't look like the red hot proposition it did 48 hours before, and I'm going home." I just don't know. But I would be more inclined to think it's the latter.
QUESTION: (Inaudible?)
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, you know, he -- my experience with him, he is someone who decides to do stuff, and then he goes out and does it. That's what he did in Karbala. Remember in August? That was literally an overnight -- I mean, he made the decision in the -- at night, and was done in Karbala, in charge of that operation the next morning, when he had the Shabbaniya attacks.
So, I really wouldn't say that. I would say that I am impressed that he acted decisively, and that he acted.
QUESTION: Isn't it a little bit different than attacks in Shabbaniya, 52 people killed. I mean, unless --
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Absolutely.
QUESTION: -- has been terrible for a while now.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Now, I was just making the -- not between the incidents, which were very different, but simply that he decides to do stuff, and he does it.
Shortly after I got here, when we had the second attack at the Golden Mosque in Samarra, he -- that was, I think, in the morning. And he was up there in the afternoon.
QUESTION: But don't you think a bit more planning could have gone into the operation, a bit more coordination?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, always that could be the case. And, you know, it's true that, as far as, you know, the support we were able to give it, we kind of had to put that together after the battle was joined.
But, on the other hand, their readiness to just get after it, I find impressive. And it wasn't just in Basra, incidentally. They also carried out operations in Kut, Karbala, and I think in Nasiriyah, all in the same time frame, that were their operations. So –
QUESTION: Did they consult, to your satisfaction, early enough with the U.S., with the military, with yourself, knowing that there would be a possibility of this thing expanding rocket attacks on your building right here? Do you feel that he actually reached out beyond his inner circle to you early enough to sort of say, "This is what I've got going on," and maybe get your feedback?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: You would have to talk to the coalition military on that aspect of it, because I know there was a briefing, I think, the Saturday before the operation that was to the military. I was not part of it.
My sense is that what was originally intended, or at least what I understood to be originally intended, developed in a different way, as is often the case when you actually get into a campaign. I had the understanding that this was going to be an effort to kind of get down, show they were serious with additional forces, put the squeeze on, develop a good -- a full picture of conditions, and then act accordingly. I was not expecting, frankly, you know, a major battle from day one.
But, then again, I am not -- and it's not clear to me that they decided that that's what they were going to do. As we say, the enemy has a vote in combat, and it may be that, against that plan, that as forces closed up near the city, that the militias just started having -- they had to react accordingly.
QUESTION: Some people have said that his motivation was actually more political than military, and that he took the opportunity to strike at political foes, or at least groups associated with his political foes. What do you say to that?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I really don't think so. He -- both before, during when we were in contact, and after -- has said consistently that he is going after, as he terms it, "the criminals," those who are attempting to resist and undermine the state. I really do think he sees this in national terms.
It was interesting to me, in one of his many meetings in Basra -- it was with the governor and the provincial council -- and counting it up, you had Dawa, you had Fudala, you had Supreme Council, you had independents. You had the whole political spectrum of the south down there, which also suggests to me that his inspiration in this -- and also the reaction to it, and I think that is important -- has also been national.
This is anecdotal, except -- well, the tribes are not anecdotal. I mean, it's very clear that they have moved over toward the prime minister in a very significant way. Anecdotally, talking to people that our folks work with at Umm Qasr, they are hearing that it's about time somebody did this. So I think it's not only in what the government has done. We will have to see what develops, but I think there is a pretty good chance you're going to see a popular response.
I have to say, having talked to all of the leadership repeatedly during this period -- Sunni, Shia, and Kurds -- I heard the same thing from all of them, that whatever they may have thought about the way the government got into this -- and there were some differences in views there -- they all felt that the government had to succeed, and that they had to back the prime minister and the government. So I think this is pretty national.
QUESTION: Can you expand a little bit on how you see the situation in the ports now? You say they're all in the hands of the Iraqi armed forces. Does that militia checkpoints, that militiamen and (inaudible) have completely vanished from these vicinities? I mean, what is it to you?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I can't speak with any detail on Abu Flus or Zubair. Umm Qasr, of course, as the main port, we do work with officials down there, and had the chance to talk to them since this.
What happened there was interesting. It appears that the militia elements in Umm Qasr – most, if not all of them -- had actually left Umm Qasr to go up to Basra, to get into the fight there. What was there was the facility's protection service, which is, frankly, a militia by another name. They did not resist at all, Iraqi security forces when they showed up. So they were basically disarmed and sent away.
So, the Iraqi security forces secured the perimeter and, as we understand it, are on the gates, checkpoints, monitoring who goes in and out. But port operations continue pretty much normally.
QUESTION: What's your reaction to the Iranian involvement in sort of ending the violence -- well, not ending the violence, but having the violence come back down? Apparently, the parliamentary delegation met with the head of the Qods Force, as well as Muqtada al Sadr, in order to get this agreement, which was described to us as an agreement, not just a statement from Muqtada al Sadr.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, let's start with the Iranian involvement, not in ending it, but maybe in beginning it, very clear to us here, because we got the fins of -- the tail fins of what was dropping on us, very clear to the prime minister down in Basra, because they were dropping on him, too. And this was, quite literally, made in Iran. All of this stuff was out of Iran, and a lot of it, you know, manufactured in 2007.
Now, not that this is exactly -- would make the front page news, that the Iranians are involved in supporting the special groups, but pretty good indication of the extent to which they are, and what that support translates as, in terms of the threat to security in Iraq.
And I think, you know, certainly talking to Iraqis again of all political stripes and every community, that's certainly the sense that they have drawn from all of this. The prime minister and others in the government have said very directly, "There was no deal," and indeed, the statement is -- it came -- the version I saw, it came out of -- I looked at his name -- Sadr trend letterhead.
So, you know, I am pretty modest about what I say I know about the Iranians. I mean, I have not been in Iran for decades. It is an extremely complicated place. So, I can't tell you whether the Iranians were instrumental in bringing about the position that, as I said, Muqtada took, or whether they just didn't stop him from doing it. I just really don't know.
QUESTION: There are some who would say that the Iranians actually have more influence over the Iraqis than the Americans, based on what we saw this week, the -- you know, the meeting that was held in Iran. And, soon after, we saw the violence subside dramatically. What would you say to that?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, I'm just not sure you can connect the dots between the two. By the same token, there were meetings here, a visit of President Ahmadi-Nejad, and then the violence started. I'm not prepared to make that connection, either, but I just throw it out there to see -- you know, you cannot ascertain that cause and effect.
Look, we have -- a lot of us have talked before about this, and a lot of you know probably way more than me about it, but you know, the Sadr trend is, it seems to me both an important and a complex political movement. I remind myself and others that, in its origins, it was populist, Iraqi Nationalist, and Arab Nationalist, and in part, defined itself in opposition to Iran -- this was back in the 1990s.
So it's got a very core, I think, Iraqi/Arab identity. And even though Sayyad Muqtada is in Iran, and has been the whole year I've been here -- and I would not invite you to draw any connections between that, either -- you do wonder if, when Iranian munitions start flying all over the place, launched by elements that, at least in name, imply a connection to the whole Sadr movement, you wonder if that movement, in its political dimensions, doesn't get pretty uncomfortable, and say, "I don't want to go there."
That, to me, is at least as good, if not better, an analysis for the position that the Sadr trend took, and that Sayyad Muqtada took, than it was somehow the result of the Iranians telling him to do it. That's why I made the point that it may be more a case of the Iranians not stopping him, than actually encouraging him. But that is speculative, I admit it.
QUESTION: What about -- can I ask another question regarding the testimony, not about the testimony itself?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Mm-hmm.
QUESTION: But, you know, no matter what you say, clearly you can be facing people up there who -- you know, they heard you in September, and now you (inaudible) again, obviously with hopes of being able to carry new numbers up there, showing a drastic decline in the tax, drastic decline in casualties.
That's all changed drastically, because of what happened in Basra. How much tougher does this make your job?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, I guess we will find out. But, you know, I see this -- it was a spike, obviously. But you know -- knock on wood -- give the course of the last few days, it's shaping to have been maybe just that, an anomaly, with a lot of offsetting positives that I have characterized as how I see them.
And it in no way, I think, erases significant progress in various spheres, political and economic, over the last number of months, as well as security. I mean, again, like everything else, we will have to see what happens. Gains are fragile, and this episode demonstrates that. There are all kinds of challenges out there. Here is another one.
But I mean what's really different here is not the threat, or the challenge itself. That's been there, in Basra, for quite some time. What's different is that the Iraqi government resolved to go do something about it. And that I see as a positive.
QUESTION: Do you wish they had waited a couple of weeks?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I -- you know, this is obviously an important part of our own process. And -- but you know, I would in no way suggest to the Iraqi government that, "Gee, you know, do you really have to take a major strategic step a week before I've got to go sit in front of Congress?" No, I would not have that kind of conversation.
QUESTION: I would like to look to the future a little bit. The sense of -- start with the past. Who got Maliki out of it? I mean, once they -- if we accept the analysis that they intended to go in, as he said in the press conference this morning, he said, you know, "We intended to go in (inaudible), whoops, it turned out to be a lot bigger than we thought." Who -- what sort of political deals were put in place, and by whom, to get him (inaudible), because he insists he sent no delegations anywhere.
And, looking forward, is he now weaker, and how much weaker, and greatly weakened by what happened?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, on the former, I think it was the development of events, because, although we didn't have that discussion directly, I think if a real hot fight continued, knowing him, he would have stayed down there. I think things had calmed to the point where he felt that he had the situation under control -- he did leave his Interior and Defense ministers down there -- but that he could -- that the circumstances allowed him to come back up here. And, frankly, I would agree with that.
In terms of the way forward, we will have to see how politics develop. Certainly what I have seen up to now -- as I was saying, I talked to the whole range of political leaders here -- he has had very strong support throughout the operation.
Now, again, this is an open political system, and you saw, in the last couple of seconds, the council of representatives was assembling committees to look into this matter, and calling for investigations. Sound familiar? And you know, politics here are pretty lively. And how the Basra events are dealt with within the Iraqi political churn, I just -- I don't really know. But, going into it, I think the prime minister has had very strong backing.
QUESTION: What I was trying to get at was when they were enmeshed militarily down there, was it SCIRI, was it coalition people who were fanning out and talking to the tribes, talking to whoever, to try and put together a political (inaudible)? And where does that leave him now? Because it seems to me, basically, he's got SCIRI and he's -- and no one else. He has antagonized the Sadrists within his own coalition.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: The tribal element, he managed himself, as far as I can see. You know, you may recall he had a series of meetings with different tribal leaders, three or four of them, maybe more.
But that was something he focused on almost from the beginning, and then pressed it hard straight through, and has seen it pay off. But that, you know -- did he have counsel to do it? I mean, I don't know. But he is the one who did it.
In terms of, again, where he is politically, right now he has strong Kurdish support from both PUK and KDP, Supreme Council, of course. He seems to have strong support from independent Shia, the ones I've talked to. And the Iraqi Islamic Party put out a good statement, and I've heard from Vice President Hashimi that he is supporting the prime minister.
Now, again, politics and open society. How long does that support last? What happens going forward I can't begin to predict. But I certainly don't see the prime minister in a weakened position as of right now.
QUESTION: What about Sadr? (Inaudible) out of this?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: You know, I don't really think he has. The -- I think it puts in front of him again this problem he has had out there for some time, certainly since last August, and a little even before that. Where does he want to take this movement? Does he want it to move forward as a mainstream part of Iraqi political life? Or, is he going to tie it to extremist militia elements? So I'm just not sure he can ride both those horses.
QUESTION: How much attention of yours and of the military's, the U.S. military's, does this grab this week? It seems -- and walking into Washington is going to be an issue with this, I assume -- that it's the Iraqi political dynamic that will dictate the level and the pace of violence here, despite how much control the U.S. can assert here. If the Iraqis want to fight, they're going to fight.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, it clearly consumed a whole lot of everybody's time, including yours. And yet, at the same time, you know, I was struck -- because, you know, when you're getting incoming, you feel like the whole world is shooting at you. So it was, a couple of times during this process, more than mildly interesting that, actually, life went on out there. The council of ministers met and passed the first tranche of the budget for the Iraqi Electoral Commission, so they can get on with election preparations, so forth and so on.
In terms of what it tells us about the future, I mean, one thing, clearly, is that Iraqi security forces are going to be increasingly in the lead: a good thing. Does it mean that our role is, in some way, diminished? Not really in that sense. I continue to think that we have a very important role in driving down violence in areas where we're deployed.
Now, Basra is a province under Iraqi control since December. We're not there at all, and British are in over-watch. So we weren't, obviously, the factor there, but I think we're a pretty important factor in the places where we are, you know, whether it is Anbar or Baghdad, Diyala (ph), Mosul.
QUESTION: Do you think the British were a little bit hasty about handing over to Iraqi (inaudible) control and giving (inaudible) surprised by how badly –
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, again, the Iraqis were pushing, you know, very, very hard for that. My understanding is the British actually delayed it a couple of times, but the pressure was very much there.
And, you know, there were a couple of things we were all looking at. One was the Basra Palace. Could that be handed off successfully from British forces to the Iraqi government? And it was. We all thought that that was a reasonably positive indicator for it.
But this goes back to your question, Miguel, in a sense. It is Iraq. It is a sovereign country. It has a government that is asserting itself. And when that government says, "Listen, seriously guys, Basra needs to move to Iraqi control," there is a certain point past which you can't say, "No, you can't have control of your province."
QUESTION: The one thing that -- what strikes me is that it seems that it's actually the militia that turns things on. Basra Palace being handed over, there was an agreement with them. When this delegation went to Iraq and Sadr said, "All right, don't fight the government," they were able to go into certain neighborhoods that they couldn't pierce. And so, in the end, it seemed that Maliki was the aggressor, and Sadr was the moderate one who was saying, "Okay, don't fight your brothers. Hand olive branches out, give them Korans."
And so, why is this success for Maliki, if really he had to get a militia to stand down in order to do it?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Again, that goes back to the issue of: is there a single, monolithic entity out there that is -- that -- so that Muqtada al Sadr equals Jaish al Mahdi equals special groups, and it's really all the same?
Again, I don't think that's the case. I think it's -- I think the kinds of violence we saw coming out of these militia elements was not something, ultimately, that the Sadr movement itself liked -- not even ultimately; I think they didn't like it from the beginning. So –
QUESTION: Well, what proof do you have of that? I mean, what proof do you have it is only these so-called special groups that are involved in the fighting that we saw last week? I mean –
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Oh, no, I don't think that's the case.
QUESTION: I mean, it seems a much wider –
SPEAKER: No, no –
QUESTION: Way, much wider.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: No, I don't think that's the case at all. I think everybody got –
QUESTION: Everybody got involved?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Yes.
QUESTION: Okay.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I think it was the special groups who set it off, but then everybody piled on. I mean, because as we were discussing, it wasn't even just JAM, it was all of these other militia outfits out there. And that's, again, what I meant in saying I do think that the Sadr trend, the political movement, has a dilemma. You know, which way do they want to go with this? Because, as Iraq evolves, what was a sustainable position -- which is to have it both ways -- I think becomes increasingly unsustainable.
And you could actually draw some interesting parallels with Lebanon, you know, where Hezbollah has been able to sustain, you know, this two-track approach. But Lebanon is Lebanon -- you know, Syria, Israel, Iran -- all of the factors that have kept a central government from really taking hold there.
Here, I think you're increasingly seeing a central government that is developing authority and capability, and you know, I just don't think that, given that evolution, that where the Sadrists are now is necessarily where they're going to stay.
(Several questioners speak simultaneously.)
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Wait. Has anybody not had a chance to -- okay, shoot away.
QUESTION: I mean, Sadr's position, you know, as articulated by a number of their political (inaudible), they are the aggrieved party, that it is under the guise of security forces, and that it's not so much a question of Basra, it's a question of activities throughout the south, which has denied them the opportunity to develop more of a political arm. Don't we have an element of this?
I mean, (inaudible) with Hezbollah, because (inaudible) position in the Shia community in Lebanon, whereas the Sadr position would be that they are people under siege, in effect.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Well, there is one other similarity between Jaish al Mahdi and Hezbollah, in that they both enjoy extensive Iranian military support.
But, again, that's an important question. I believe -- and I certainly made this point at a variety of levels -- that the Iraqi government, at all levels, you know, federal and provincial, has an obligation to act as a government, and that it is extremely important they do so, that the image not be created of government officials using their authority, particularly in the security realm, to advance a political agenda, or settle political scores. That is vital. And I do not think that's what the prime minister was doing in Basra. I do think it happens.
QUESTION: Should he have gone down there? Should he have made it so personal?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Oh, look. That's just the way he's going to do it. That is -- I mean –
QUESTION: But from a purely political appearance, I mean, is it –
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I don't know. We will have to see how Iraqis react to it. I think people kind of like to see leaders lead from the front. But I can't really posit what the reaction is. I mean, but that's just -- that's what he does, you know.
QUESTION: Did he tell you he was going down beforehand?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Oh, yes. Mm-hmm, yes.
QUESTION: Did you suggest maybe he shouldn't?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: No, no.
STAFF: We have time for --
QUESTION: Just we understand that Muqtada’s office has put out statement saying that Muqtada is calling for a million people to converge on Najaf on April 9 for a demonstration against U.S. presence in Iran. Is that news potentially destabilizing, given the events of last week?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I did hear about that, yes. Well, we will have to see what will happen. I remember that some time ago he had called for a mass convergence on Samarra, after the bombing in that, and it didn't happen.
But again, you know, look. Millions of people converged on Karbala for the Arba'een in very peaceful conditions. I think that's what Iraqis now expect and want to see. And I think that's something that he would have to take very much into account. I mean, if his intention is to get a whole lot of people together and go make trouble in Najaf, I don't think that's going to be very –
QUESTION: Just to pick up on something you said earlier on, you seem to be suggesting, or leaving open the possibility, that the commission was kind of reluctant to come out of Basra, that if you had been able to, you would have stayed on, but you said, "Well, they were telling us to get out, so we had to get out." I mean, could you maybe –
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Oh, no. Thanks for following up, because I would not want to leave that impression. There had been talk about going to Iraqi control in the fall, and then, "Let's leave it a little longer," and December was finally the agreed date. And the reality is that with the move out of Basra Palace, in many respects, Basra was effectively already in PIC status, because British forces had gone, basically, to over-watch once they were out of the palace.
So, no, we weren't fighting it in any way, just wanted to be sure that, you know, the basic conditions were right, the palace was staying steady in government hands, and so forth.
QUESTION: Is there anything more –
QUESTION: -- forces down there now? I mean, is there any residual element going to stay down there to help out to help in the long, medium, very-long time?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: We will have to see how the situation evolves, and how the situation develops, and what the Iraqis want.
QUESTION: Do you continue to see a pronounced role for British forces down there?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Oh, absolutely I do, yes. I think the British role, once again, demonstrated the importance of the force presence as a liaison to the Iraqi commands, a liaison with, as I understand it, troop elements and logistical support, casualty evacuation. There were a number of wounded Iraqi soldiers who owe their lives to British helicopters.
And I was impressed, because British helicopters were doing medical evacuations under weather conditions when our helicopters weren't flying. So –
QUESTION: But many people have said this week that after the U.S. has spent billions of dollars and trained Iraqi security forces, that they basically showed that they were incapable of standing on their own in Basra and elsewhere, and still needed the help of U.S. and British troops. How would you response to that?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: Yes, I just -- I see it in opposite terms. As it was lain out earlier, the fact that they could, you know, plan and execute this, and then, when they ran into circumstances that they were not expecting, showing ability to adjust, to put more reliance on special forces, on the Iraqi special forces down there instead of the main regular forces, picking discreet, achievable objectives, going after those, it all showed me that they are coming into their own as a force that can plan, execute, and change plans.
Were there a lot of problems? There were a boatload of problems. And there is still, obviously, a long way to go. But this kind of thing -- and then, again, plus the other things they were doing, all at the same time. I don't know what the total number of forces moved in, say, this 10-day period was, but a division's worth in Basra, plus significant moves elsewhere at Kut and Karbala, that's not an insignificant capability.
QUESTION: What happens to the plans to disarm the militias? There was a deadline given until April 8th. How is the Iraqi or military, with the support of the coalition, going to go after arms from these militias from JAM, who calls itself the resistance force, much like justifying having the weapons in the first place.
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: I don't -- I didn't discuss that yesterday with the prime minister, actually, what his plan is, going forward. There is a differentiation between light and heavy weapons. It's the heavy weapons that he is focused on lately. But I would have to say I don't know what the next step is.
QUESTION: Should they be disarmed? Should JAM be disarmed of the heavy weapons?
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: It -- Iraq is -- as we talk about the evolution here, as the government becomes more capable, I think we're seeing the increasingly anomalous and pernicious nature of an enduring militia presence. Because, again, that militia wasn't fighting the coalition, it was fighting the Iraqi government.
So -- and that comes back again, I think, the Sadr trend has to make some decisions, because ultimately, I think we're seeing Iraq evolve into a state where militia presence is not only unacceptable, it's -- at the end of the day, it's not going to be tolerable.
And the Iranians have to make some decisions, too. Are they going to support the state, or are they going to support the instrumentalities that seek to undermine the state? And, again, I don't think the option is really there any longer for either the Sadr movement itself, or the Iranian government to do both because of a state that is getting stronger and more capable and has said we’re not going to stand for it. Now, again, lots to be seen. Having taken a commendable position that they are not going to accept this kind of presence, they will then have to make good on it, whether it’s through removal of heavy weapons or through the other necessary steps to actually take full control of every area where militias are embedded. And I can’t predict when and how that will go. It will be crucial to the future of the country that it proceed. But that’s the position Maliki has staked out, and that’s why I started with this. And you must all think it’s significant, too, because I don’t think we talked about anything else. (Laughter.)
Okay, thanks.
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