2008 Press Releases
Ambassador Ryan Crocker Interview with Al Jazeera English (AJE)
July 10, 2008
AMBASSADOR CROCKER: That is a rumor. I have said publicly that I would expect to leave fairly soon after the change in administrations in January. But I would expect to be here for some time to come, until probably February or so.
Well, as you know, the dialects are always a challenge. But what I find here in Iraq is that all Iraqis that have been through high school, for example, really speak good standard Arabic. So I haven't had much of a problem understanding or being understood.
Well, thank you, Jazim (ph). I don't really see a contradiction. Negotiations are ongoing. They are taking place in a rapidly improving security climate. And I really think we are all saying pretty much the same thing. Iraqis are increasingly desirous of taking control of security in their country, increasingly able to do so, and that is exactly what we want to see, too.
And the following day, yesterday, Dr. Robai (ph) spoke of a planning time horizon. And I think that is exactly what we are talking about. It is important to bear in mind that force withdrawals are already underway, and they will continue. This month, the last of the so-called surge brigades departs Iraq. That will reduce our combat power by 25 percent over what it was at the height of the surge, at the same time that casualties are at their lowest levels since early 2004.
So, as conditions continue to stabilize and improve, we all anticipate future force withdrawals, and indeed, perhaps at a pace faster than any of us expected. So we are talking about the same thing, I think, here: time horizons, a joint commitment that Iraqis are going to be doing more as we are able to progressively reduce our numbers and our profile, moving forward to a time -- and it may be, again, sooner than anyone expected -- when Iraqis are in full control of security in this country.
In this, as in so many other things, Jazim, getting it right is more important than getting it quick. I think both governments, both peoples, would like to conclude agreements as quickly as possible that pave the way for an end to the current chapter 7 resolution that mark full sovereignty by Iraqis over their affairs. It is natural to want to get it done as rapidly as we can.
What we have to do is have in place before the end of the year a legal basis for our forces, so that the Security Council resolution can expire and not be renewed. That, of course, will mark a very significant moment in Iraq's history, as it takes its place on the international stage as a fully sovereign country in charge of its own affairs.
Well, the imperative here is to have a basic legal agreement in place that provides for the necessary authorities and protections for U.S. and other coalition forces to operate in support of Iraq after the end of the year. And, indeed, another way to look at it is to say that there are also combinations of options.
For example, we are working now on a broad strategic framework with the Iraqis that will frame our relationship for the future in a variety of spheres: diplomatic, scientific, economic, cultural, educational, as well as security. In addition to that agreement, there could be a short temporary agreement, a protocol or something like it, that would provide the basic authorities that I just spoke of for a temporary period, until that longer-term status-of-forces agreement is concluded. These agreements, on the average, take us two years to negotiate under peace-time conditions. So you could actually combine these options.
But what is important, we all agree, is that there be something in place before the end of the year that will allow us to continue to operate, on a temporary basis, in support of Iraq.
I guess the best way to answer that, Jazim, is to say that, basically, the United States and Iraq -- Americans and Iraqis -- are seeking the same thing. Iraqis want to be fully in charge of their security; that is what we want, too. We do not want an extended period in which we are present in Iraq in a combat role. We do not want permanent bases, and Iraq does not want us to have them.
That is why, I think, the statements that we are seeing now are so positive. They reflect the enormous improvement in security conditions, the improvement in Iraqi security force capabilities, the determination of the Iraqi government to run its own affairs. We all welcome that. We do not in any way want to prolong our presence in Iraq in a combat role. We want that to be as short as possible, and to be able to draw it down as quickly as possible.
We are taking into account Iraq's full sovereignty. That is something Iraqis insist on, and it's something, I think, that all of us want to see. We are negotiating an agreement that, by definition, has to be mutually acceptable: acceptable to the U.S. and acceptable to Iraq. And I think that, at the end of this effort -- and it will be a totally transparent document, when it is concluded; everyone is going to see what it is -- what they will see is that it gives Iraq and Iraqis what they want, what they need.
The Iraqi Council of Representatives, we understand, will take it up. That is Iraq's process of turning this into a legally binding agreement. But I think that everyone is going to see that what is concluded at the end of the process is something that reaffirms Iraq's full sovereignty.
Jazim, we have said repeatedly, Iraqi government representatives have said repeatedly, this is going to be an open and transparent document. Iraqi laws, as we understand it, call for that, that this agreement must go before Parliament. And on our side, as well, as have pledged to be fully open with the Congress of the United States.
We are in the process of negotiation now. And in a complex negotiation, which this is, it doesn't make a lot of sense to be briefing anyone's parliament in detail on positions that are not yet final, that are likely to shift as the negotiations proceed. When we get to the point where we have an agreement, then clearly, we will be briefing on that agreement in detail, as will the Iraqis.
At the end of this process, it will be an open and transparent one. While it is underway, as I said, it does not in any way advance anyone's understanding to be putting out in the public domain positions that are likely to alter during further discussion.
It is, in the U.S. system, an executive agreement. An executive agreement is legally binding. But, at the same time, it is binding while it is in force. There is nothing in that, this agreement or any other executive agreement, that would tie the hands of this or any future President.
It is also important to keep this in perspective. Security agreements around the world that we have negotiated over the past few decades have all been executive agreements. None of them have been treaties. So, what we are doing here is in no way exceptional. It follows a very well-established practice in the United States.
Iraqi forces are already taking hold of the security and the destiny of the country. That is exactly what happened in Basra, in Sadr City, in Maysan, in Mosul, in other parts of Iraq. The progress that Iraqi security forces have made over the past year is simply amazing. It demonstrates both the capability and the determination of Iraqis to exercise security functions themselves.
Seventy-five percent of Iraq's military units are now in the lead in providing security in this country. It is a tremendous achievement. And, obviously, we believe it is only going to move in one direction, and that is to increasingly greater Iraqi control over security, until that control is total.
I think what you are referring to, Jazim, is something we call operational readiness assessments that are divided into four categories, one being the highest and four being the least capable. These are mathematical formulas that have to do with numbers of officers, numbers of non-commissioned officers, and so forth. If a unit is at ORA-2 instead of ORA-1, that does not mean that it is somehow incapable of fighting. The ORA-2 units are perfectly capable of doing that. They are doing it. And they are in the lead in providing security.
There is an important distinction that we are trying to make here. When we talk about the benchmarks, we are talking about either fully realized or satisfactory progress being made to their realization.
If one is trying to assess reality in Iraq, it is not a black and white situation. Just take security forces, for example. While you do not have 100 percent of Iraqi security forces at the top tier of operational readiness, that in no way means they are not capable forces. They are. We may not have 100 percent implementation on something like debaathification reform, but there is a law, and they are now working on how to fully implement it through the establishment of a new commission, and so forth. So, we think that that indicates there is satisfactory progress, even though every final step has not yet been taken.
I would add one other factor to the improvement of security, because I think it is extremely important, and that is the attitude of the Iraqi people. Iraqis, whether Arab Sunni, Arab Shia, or Kurd, have said, "We are tired of the violence, we are tired of extremist militias, whether they are extremist Shia militias or extremist Sunni militias," and they have stood against these groups. And whether it is in the south, in Basra, in Baghdad, or out in the west, in Anbar, you see this time and time again. And I think it is a very key point.
With respect to Iran, Iran has suffered some setbacks in recent months. Militias that they have supported, that they have armed, trained, and financed have gone into combat against Iraqi security forces, and have been significantly hurt. Many elements of these militias have fled into Iran. So, I think the real reason for the improvement in security is not what the Iranians are doing to make things better, but the damage that the Iraqi government's forces have done to militias that Iran has supported.
Iran has a choice to make here. Their stated policy is to support the democratic government in Iraq. What they have been doing in recent years has been the opposite, it's been to undermine that government. As this government becomes more and more capable, it's time for the Iranians to make a choice to support that government, and to stop supporting militias.
I said it just as I meant it. Iran is Iraq's neighbor. It will always be Iraq's neighbor. And it needs to decide what kind of relationship it wants. The past between these two countries is extremely bitter. There is an opportunity here to build a much more stable future for Iran, for Iraq, and for the region. But that is not going to happen with the course that Iran has been on, supporting militias, instead of supporting the government.
No, Iraq is emerging from the violence of the past couple of years as a democratic country in charge of its own affairs. In that sense, the future is now. There are many, many challenges out there. It will take a long time, I think, for Iraqis to overcome all of the problems they inherited from the Saddam era. But the progress they have made, where they are today, I think can give us all tremendous encouragement that the future is going to be far, far brighter than the past.
Thank you, Jazim.
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