Embassy of the United States

2007 Press Releases

Excerpts From Western Media Roundtable With Ambassador Ryan Crocker

Execution of Sultan Hashem:

• This is an Iraqi judicial process. We think it is very important that the rule of law be respected here and that the time be taken to be sure that all of the issues are clarified.

Istanbul Neighbor’s Ministerial:

• We are almost exactly six months after the first ministerial at Sharm el-Sheikh, and a lot has happened on the ground in Iraq since then, most significantly, the marked drop-off in violence in Baghdad, Anbar, and elsewhere.
• We think this is something that the neighbors should take careful note of, and understand, as I think they do, that what happens in Iraq and the future of Iraq is vital to their own interests and security, and that as we convene this time in Istanbul, there are a lot of positive indications out there. So we will be urging more involvement in a positive way by the neighbors.
• Saudi Arabia has announced, of course, that it is reopening its embassy. We would like to see others of the neighbors do the same thing, and just in general, step up the positive engagement with Iraq, and as appropriate, step down the negative engagement.

U.S. Role in Dispute Between Turkey, the Kurds, and PKK:

• We have been very actively engaged with the Turkish government, the Iraqi government, with Kurdish representatives, over the last couple of weeks. We have been telling Iraqis -- all Iraqis, Kurds and others -- that there have got to be concrete, definitive steps as well as statements to demonstrate Iraq's seriousness in not tolerating a terrorist presence on its soil.
• With the Turks, we have been registering our support, our sympathy for their losses, our understanding of their outrage, which we share, but also stressing that decisions on where to go from here have to be very carefully taken, that consequences have to be weighed. And in particular, we have cautioned that military action across the border could be dangerously destabilizing, to the detriment of all our interests.
• It is reasonable to expect the Iraqis to use all the means that they have to monitor PKK movements, including roads, airports, whatnot, to make an active effort to try to learn what travel patterns may be, and then be prepared to act if these guys, come down out of that mountain south into areas under Iraqi government control, including the Kurdish regional government. That I think is not only reasonable, it's an expectation.

Iran:

• With respect to Iran and the talks, we did establish a working group that has met. There are no additional rounds scheduled, but my expectation is that the process continues, that we will have such a round.
• It is important for us to continue to push them to try to, by various means, bring their practices into line with their stated policies.
• There have been indications again that, looking to Lebanon and their role there, that they have been working on the Hezbollah-ization of at least parts of Iraq, to use militant groups, particularly Jaish al Mahdi, as a means of asserting Iran's influence, weakening the government, and by indirection, by proxy, exerting control in Iraq.

Security:

• I think it continues to be a mixed and cloudy picture. We've seen some interesting developments -- for example, over the last couple of months, a virtual cessation of indirect fire on the international zone. We have seen Muqtada al-Sadr's announcement at the end of August calling on Jaish al Mahdi to stop its activities, and I just saw today a television report of a further statement by Muqtada al-Sadr saying that that cessation of activities includes even military actions in self-defense, that he means a total stand-down.
• What we've seen over the last couple of months, of course, is major success by the Iraqis and ourselves against al-Qaida. I've seen some of your headlines. You're certainly not going to hear from me that al-Qaida is defeated; victory is at hand. Al-Qaida has shown an extraordinary persistence, and they are persisting now. But clearly, their abilities have been badly damaged, and you can just -- I mean, you remember where we were in terms of al-Qaida attacks six months ago and where we are now, you can see it.
• In a sense, that puts into highlight, I think, the other big problem, which are the militias, and particularly again Jaish al Mahdi. I think there are enough indications out there that Jaish al Mahdi is again resilient. So in different parts of Baghdad, I think we've seen Jaish al Mahdi militant kind of transform itself into Jaish al Mahdi Incorporated. They may not be shooting at us or Iraqi soldiers, but controlling gas stations, controlling real estate, you know, controlling trade, controlling services -- that is a major challenge to the state. And it will be a difficult problem to tackle, but one that I think has to be.
• In Baghdad, violence is also much diminished, not to the extent in most of Anbar, but diminished. Al-Qaida similarly on the ropes, although obviously still present. Sunni militias increasingly going out of the militia business and coming over to say, we want to hook up with the coalition, and indeed with the government of Iraq.
• People just aren't confident yet that that's definitively, conclusively over. And I think it's going to be a while before they do. If I were one of them, I'd certainly feel that way. It's why the process that's underway now in some of the mixed neighborhoods is so important. You know, it's one thing to accept local citizens who want to turn against al-Qaida, say in a Sunni area. And they become volunteers, and then you transition them to the Ministry of Interior. That's one thing, and not without its complications.

Future of Iraq:

• With respect to the future, again, the future in Iraq can be defined in a lot of ways. But a key definition, as it is for any state, is the state's ability to exercise sovereign control all of its own territory.

Job Creation:

• I'm just thinking of Anbar, where the government showed up with the money. And money counts. Well, we've seen, kind of thousands increasing of individuals coming forward and saying, you know, we don't want to carry a gun for anybody except the government, if we can get a salary and so forth, we're getting into numbers that no security forces can absorb even if you don't have political tensions. It's just too many.
• So I've had discussions with the government. What they want, they want jobs. I mean, they want something that looks like a stable future, is what we hear. We've got -- through the community stabilization program and others, we do a lot of job creation. And I've asked my folks to -- okay, let's look at everything we're doing. Let's look at the areas where violence has come down and where people are coming up. And let's see -- let's be sure we're using our resources where they can have a strategic effect. And let's have that discussion with the government.
• And I've had it now at the prime ministerial level. The government needs to spin up, I think, for job creation assistance in mixed neighborhoods and elsewhere -- you know, civil jobs. And the prime minister says he's fully supportive of that.

Reconciliation:

• It's why I think events such as Tariq al-Hashimi's visit to Najaf and the meeting with Sistani become important. It's why Amar al-Hakim's visit to Ramadi is important, and the efforts that Sheik Ahmed has made to engage the sheiks of Karbala in the meetings between the governors of Anbar and Karbala.
• It's all of this cross-communal activity that I think is important. We've seen an increase in that, a significant increase in that, over the last few months. And it's no coincidence that that's going up, I think, as violence tends down. These sorts of efforts and gestures would have been virtually impossible, I think, back last spring at some of the height of the violence.
• But more clearly, it needs to be done. And again, we may find national leaders sort of taking their cue from lower levels. If you've got local level reconciliation moving, then that's a signal up the line. And, you know, of course, Prime Minister Maliki has been out to Anbar. He's been to Tikrit. And, you know, he was the one who made the decision, for example, on the absorption of a significant number of young men in Abu Ghraib into the Iraqi police. And all of those, 1700-odd, that was his personal order to do that even though a number of them clearly had been part of the Sunni insurgency.
• But, you know, I said this, you may remember, earlier on in my tenure and I still believe it: You know, a single word at the time I got here that in my mind distilled modern Iraq was "fear." And to a significant degree, fear is still very much part of the scene, and you know all its dimensions. The Shia fear that the Sunnis are really just waiting for the day when they can reassert the old ascendancy. The Sunni fear that they are a community under pressure, if not actually in peril. And then the Kurdish fear of all manner of things.
• So, that fear is deeply rooted. The sectarian violence of 2006 definitely deepened it, and it isn't going to go away overnight. But leaders have to take steps and make moves, and I can tell you we encourage leaders in both communities to do just that.

Troops in Iraq:

• General Petraeus made his recommendations on force levels that the President accepted back in September. And we were all clear at the time that looking six months ahead was as far as we could look, that our force deployments and redeployments need to be tied to conditions. Conditions need to be carefully assessed because it's not just about, well, we got violence here and therefore you got to have troops there. It's, you know, what kind of violence? What are its origins? What are its dimensions? You know, does the U.S. coalition military presence actually get at the problem, or maybe not?

Steps Iraqi Government Should Take Regarding PKK:

• Well, I think there are a number of things. First is just the declaratory policy. I mean, statements don't solve problems but statements are important. And the statements the Iraqi government has been making over the last couple of months, as well as the last couple of weeks, I think have been important. This is a terrorist organization. It has no place on Iraqi soil. It is counter to Iraq's interests and its policy that this organization would even be there, let alone conduct operations.
• I think it is important to get that out there. They've done it. That wasn't the case in the past.
• I think engaging with the Turks on serious discussions, what concrete steps does each side see as possible and desirable? And that really sort of gets under way today. What are those steps? You know, not for me to be the authoritative voice, but I think they are pretty obvious. You know, having a leader's lookout list; doing everything possible to interdict other movements. You know, folks heading up that way need to be stopped. Folks coming down need to be picked up to do everything possible to interdict resupply. These are not -- it is not a laundry list, but those are examples.
• We're just going to have to see what is actually done. I sense a seriousness on the part of Iraq's leaders, including its Kurdish leaders, to take these kinds of steps. But the proof will be in what they actually do. But they need to do it.

Blackwater:

• Again, these guys guard my back. And I have to say, they do it extremely well. I continue to have high regard for the individuals who work in Blackwater, as I do for the other security contractors.
• You know, that said, the incident in September was a horrific one. It has caused us to not only do a very detailed investigation of that particular incident, which is ongoing, but also for the Secretary to ask Ambassador Kennedy to come out with colleagues and do a top to bottom look at the entire operation. You have seen his report. There are things that need to be done and we are doing them.
• I am the Ambassador here, so I am responsible, down the line on anything under my authority, and that includes this operation. So yes, I certainly do wish that I had had the foresight to see that there were things out there that could be corrected. I think about those things all the time. When I came here, I started looking at different elements of this operation and I have changed a lot of things. And I am the guy who is responsible. So I certainly wish that I had had the foresight or the insight to say, got to get on this one right away. And indeed, I don't even make that connection, that this was an accident waiting to happen. Something bad did happen and what we've got to do now is, you know, sobered by that, then look at the whole thing and that's what we're doing.
• We've still got the specific investigation ongoing. But in terms of their capabilities, all the security contractors operating here I think have done a pretty darned good job of keeping us alive out here, because we just haven't lost anybody that has been under their protection.
• This was obviously an extremely serious incident. I felt that it warranted an FBI investigation. I asked for that. And that is what we got. So, you know how it works. Anything that is going to be said about that investigation is going to need to be said at this point by the FBI.